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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Illinois National Insurance Company 
(“Illinois National”) and Appellees Wyndham Worldwide 
Operations, Inc., Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, 
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Wyndham Vacation Ownership Inc., and Wyndham Resort 
Development Corporation (collectively “Wyndham”) are in a 
contract dispute over insurance coverage.  In resolving this 
dispute, we must decide whether the doctrine of mutual 
mistake allows reformation of a contract against a party that 
did not participate in the negotiations. 
Illinois National filed suit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that a 2008 plane crash did not trigger coverage 
under an aircraft fleet insurance policy that it issued to Jet 
Aviation Business Jets, Inc. (“Jet Aviation”).  Wyndham filed 
a counterclaim seeking coverage and filed motions for 
summary judgment and to dismiss Illinois National‟s 
complaint.  The United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey granted Wyndham‟s motion to dismiss Illinois 
National‟s complaint as well as Wyndham‟s motion for 
summary judgment on its counterclaim.  On appeal, Illinois 
National argues that the District Court erred both when it 
determined that mutual mistake can only serve as a basis for 
reformation in an action against a bargaining party and when 
it held that Illinois National had insufficiently pled mutual 
mistake.  We agree and hold that New Jersey law allows 
reformation on the basis of mutual mistake against a party 
that did not participate in the negotiation of a contract and 
that Illinois National sufficiently pled mutual mistake. 
For the following reasons, we conclude that the 
District Court‟s grant to Wyndham of summary judgment was 
improper, as was its dismissal of Illinois National‟s 
complaint.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment and dismissal and remand for 




 Illinois National issues insurance products and 
services.  Jet Aviation offers aircraft maintenance, 
completions and refurbishment, engineering, and fixed base 
operations, along with aircraft management, charter services, 
aircraft sales and personnel services.  Wyndham is a 
recognized service leader in the hospitality industry. 
 Illinois National provided insurance coverage to Jet 
Aviation and to some of Jet Aviation‟s clients, so long as Jet 
Aviation managed the client‟s aircraft and aircraft usage.  Jet 
Aviation managed an aircraft owned by Wyndham and 
provided insurance for that aircraft pursuant to the terms of a 
series of Aircraft Management Services Agreements. 
 In 2001, Wyndham‟s predecessor, Cendant 
Operations, Inc., and Jet Aviation entered into the first of 
these Aircraft Management Services Agreements.  Among 
other things, the agreements obligated Jet Aviation to provide 
domestic flight planning and scheduling, flight crew staffing, 
and management of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance 
for Wyndham‟s aircraft.  If Wyndham‟s aircraft was not 
available when needed, Jet Aviation could arrange for an 
aircraft for Wyndham‟s use from another source.  Pursuant to 
the Aircraft Management Services Agreements, Jet Aviation 
agreed to procure insurance for Wyndham‟s aircraft while it 
was managed by Jet Aviation.  The agreement also stated that 
it would provide Wyndham with insurance coverage when 
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Wyndham used non-owned aircraft at the direction of Jet 
Aviation. 
 For successive one-year periods beginning in 2004, 
and through the 2008 policy year, a series of aircraft fleet 
management insurance policies were purchased by Jet 
Aviation and issued by Illinois National.  Each was 
negotiated by Illinois National and Jet Aviation, directly and 
through their agents.  The policies contained endorsements 
that provided coverage for Jet Aviation‟s clients.  These 
clients were identified on the endorsements as “Insured 
 6 
Owners” and also as “Named Insured.”1  The 2004-2007 
Policies contain the following Managed Aircraft 
Endorsement: 
                                                 
1
 The Managed Aircraft Endorsement from 2004-2008 
stated: 
 
1) Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc. 
has entered into an Aircraft 
Management Agreement with the 
person(s) or organization(s) 
described below and referred to as 
“Insured Owner”: 
 
Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., Wyndham 
Worldwide Corporation & Bank of America, N.A., as 
Lessor 
7 Sylvan Way 
Parsippany, NJ 07504 
 
 And/or subsidiary (and/or subsidiary 
thereof). 
 
2) The definition of Named Insured is 
extended to include the person(s) or 




4) The insurance afforded by this policy for 
the interest of the “Insured Owner” 
described in Item 1. of this endorsement 
shall not be invalidated by any act or 
neglect of Jet Aviation Business Jets, 
Inc. listed in Item 1 of the policy 
Declarations provided that the “Insured 
Owner” described in Item 1. of this 
endorsement did not consent to such act 
or neglect which would otherwise 
invalidate the insurance provided by this 
policy or that the “Insured Owner” 
described in Item 1. of this endorsement 
had no knowledge that such act or 
neglect to which they consented would 
invalidate the insurance provided by this 
policy. 
The insurance afforded by this policy for 
the interest of the Jet Aviation Business 
Jets, Inc. listed in Item 1 of the policy 
Declarations shall not be invalidated by 
any act or neglect of the “Insured 
Owner” described in Item 1. of this 
endorsement provided that the Named 
Insured listed in Item 1. of the policy 
Declarations did not consent to such act 
                                                                                                             
(App. at A471 (2004 Policy, with Cendant listed because 
Wyndham had not yet been spun off); (Id. at A1235 (2008 
Policy).).) 
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or neglect which would otherwise 
invalidate the insurance provided by this 
policy. 
5) The insurance afforded by this policy for 
the interest of the “Insured Owner” 
described in Item 1 of this endorsement 
or Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc. (as 
fully described in Item 1 of the 
Declarations Page) is extended to other 
Aircraft insured under this policy but 
excluding any Non-Owned Aircraft 
unless such Non-Owned Aircraft is 
operated by or used at the direction of Jet 
Aviation Business Jets, Inc. . . .  
(App at. A471.) 
 In the negotiations leading up to the 2008 policy, Jet 
Aviation proposed new language for the endorsement.  The 
revised endorsement, which was integrated into the 2008 
policy, replaced “Jet Aviation” with “Named Insured.”  It 
provided: 
4) The insurance afforded by this policy for 
the interest of the “Insured Owner” 
described in Item 1. of this endorsement 
shall not be invalidated by any act or 
neglect of the Named Insured listed in 
Item 1 of the policy Declarations 
provided that the “Insured Owner” 
described in Item 1. of this endorsement 
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did not consent to such act or neglect 
which would otherwise invalidate the 
insurance provided by this policy or that 
the “Insured Owner” described in Item 1. 
of this endorsement had no knowledge 
that such act or neglect to which they 
consented would invalidate the insurance 
provided by this policy. 
The insurance afforded by this policy for 
the interest of the Named Insured listed 
in Item 1 of the policy Declarations shall 
not be invalidated by any act or neglect 
of the “Insured Owner” described in Item 
1. of this endorsement provided that the 
Named Insured listed in Item 1. of the 
policy Declarations did not consent to 
such act or neglect which would 
otherwise invalidate the insurance 
provided by this policy. 
5) The insurance afforded by this policy for 
the interest of the “Insured Owner” 
described in Item 1. of this endorsement 
or Named Insured (as fully described in 
Item 1 of the Declarations Page) is 
extended to other Aircraft insured under 
this policy but excluding any Non-
Owned Aircraft unless such Non-Owned 
Aircraft is operated by or used at the 
direction of the Named Insured. . . . 
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(Id. at A1235.) 
 Jet Aviation and Illinois National claim that the 
drafting change was designed to make it more clear that 
entities affiliated with Jet Aviation were covered.  Both 
contracting parties have stated that they believed that it did 
not expand coverage to entities that were unaffiliated with Jet 
Aviation, such as Wyndham.  However, the modification, as 
written, appears to provide third parties with coverage when 
using non-owned aircraft without Jet Aviation‟s involvement. 
 Despite being drafted to seemingly provide expanded 
coverage, Wyndham‟s premium declined from $61,250 for 
the 2007 policy to $45,367 for the 2008 policy.  Wyndham 
did not know about the change made to the endorsement for 
2008 and continued to obtain non-owned aircraft liability 
coverage through a policy issued by StarNet Insurance 
Company (“StarNet”).2  
It is undisputed that neither Wyndham nor its brokers 
was involved in the negotiations or drafting of the revised 
provisions of the endorsement.  It was negotiated between 
Illinois National and Jet Aviation. 
 In August 2008, Jason Ketcheson, a Wyndham 
employee, rented a Cessna 172 from Aviation Adventures to 
travel to a work-related meeting in Oregon.  Jet Aviation had 
                                                 
2
 The StarNet policy provided coverage for non-owned 
aircraft that were not operated by or used at the direction of 
Jet Aviation.  In other words, it explicitly provides coverage 
for incidents like the 2008 plane crash. 
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no involvement in this transaction.  Ketcheson crashed into a 
house in Gearhart, Oregon, killing five people.  As a result, 
various claimants have sued Wyndham for damages.  The 
crash may have triggered coverage under the language of the 
2008 policy. 
B. 
Illinois National filed suit against Wyndham seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the 2008 policy did not cover 
claims arising out of the August 2008 Cessna crash.  It argued 
that the District Court should find that the 2008 policy, as 
written, did not provide coverage to Wyndham, or 
alternatively, that if the contract as written would provide 
coverage, the District Court should exercise its equitable 
power of reformation because there had been mutual mistake 
in the drafting of the contract between Illinois National and 
Jet Aviation.  Wyndham filed a counterclaim seeking 
coverage under the 2008 policy for the August 2008 Cessna 
crash, filing a motion to dismiss Illinois National‟s claim and 
a motion for summary judgment.  Both sides filed statements 
of material facts not in dispute; additionally, Illinois National 
filed a supplemental statement of disputed material facts and 
requested more discovery. 
The District Court granted both of Wyndham‟s 
motions, holding that Wyndham was entitled to coverage 
under the 2008 policy and that Illinois National was not 
entitled to reformation based upon the alleged mistake.  The 
District Court held that the 2008 policy was clear on its face 
and that Wyndham was entitled to coverage as a matter of 
law.  The District Court went on to explain that “because 
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Wyndham did not participate in the negotiation and drafting 
of the 2008 policy, there can be no mutual mistake.”  Illinois 
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., No. 
09-1724, 2010 WL 3326709 at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2010).  
Instead, the District Court analyzed Illinois National‟s 
argument in the context of unilateral mistake and determined 
that reformation was unavailable.  Id. at *5-6.  Further, the 
District Court dismissed Illinois National‟s complaint on the 
basis that it failed to plead mistake with particularity as 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Id. 
Illinois National filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a) because the parties‟ citizenship was completely 
diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.  We 
have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review of the District Court‟s order.  See McGovern 
v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (plenary 
review of order granting motion to dismiss); Spence v. Esab 
Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (plenary 
review of order granting summary judgment motion). 
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
--- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  A party is entitled to summary judgment 
when it demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the evidence establishes its entitlement 
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to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  In reviewing a 
motion for summary judgment, “we must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party's favor.”  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell 
USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
III. 
 Illinois National argues that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Wyndham on its counter 
claim by erroneously interpreting New Jersey law and 
concluding that reformation on the basis of mutual mistake 
can never be sought against a third-party that was not present 
when the contract was consummated.  Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 
2010 WL 3326709 at *5.  Illinois National argues that there is 
no categorical rule preventing a contracting party from 
seeking reformation for mutual mistake when the party 
against whom reformation is being sought did not participate 
in the negotiation of the contract at issue. 
 When interpreting state law, we follow a state‟s 
highest court; if that state‟s highest court has not provided 
guidance, we are charged with predicting how that court 
would resolve the issue.  Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd's London, 435 F.3d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 2006).  To do so, 
we must take into consideration:  (1) what that court has said 
in related areas; (2) the decisional law of the state 
intermediate courts; (3) federal cases interpreting state law; 
and (4) decisions from other jurisdictions that have discussed 
the issue.  Id. (citing Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 
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661, 675 (3d Cir. 2002).).  “Although lower state court 
decisions are not controlling on an issue on which the highest 
court of the state has not spoken, federal courts must attribute 
significant weight to these decisions in the absence of any 
indication that the highest state court would rule otherwise.”  
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273-74 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has set out general 
principles for contract interpretation and reformation: 
As a general rule, courts should enforce 
contracts as the parties intended.  Similarly, it is 
a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a 
court must discern and implement the common 
intention of the parties.  The court‟s role is to 
consider what is written in the context of the 
circumstances at the time of drafting and to 
apply a rational meaning in keeping with the 
expressed general purpose. 
Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 77 (N.J. 2007) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  In furtherance of the 
goal of binding parties to their mutual intent at the time of 
contracting, a court may reform a contract if it “was created 
by the negotiations of the parties, but by mutual mistake is 
wanting in formal expression or execution, so as to evince the 
actual intent of the parties.  Gross v. Yeskel, 134 A.2d 737, 
737 (N.J. Eq. 1926) (internal citations omitted). 
 “Generally, when interpreting an insurance policy, 
courts should give the policy‟s words their plain, ordinary 
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meaning.”  Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 869 A.2d 
929, 933 (N.J. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  We interpret a contract according to its plain 
language by reading the document as a whole in a fair and 
common sense manner so as to match the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.  Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-
Matin, 965 A.2d 1165, 1168-69 (N.J. 2009). 
 However, in New Jersey, even an unambiguous 
contract may be reformed when there was mutual mistake and 
the written contract does not match what the parties intended.  
Cent. State Bank v. Hudik-Ross Co., Inc., 396 A.2d 347, 350 
(N.J. Super. 1978) (“The rule that contracts may be reformed 
where there has been mutual mistake is „well settled in our 
jurisprudence.‟”).  A mutual mistake is “1. A mistake in 
which each party misunderstands the other's intent. . . . [or] 
2. A mistake that is shared and relied on by both parties to a 
contract.”  Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (8th ed. 2004). 
 Mutual mistake is evaluated by determining the 
understanding of the parties at the time the contract was 
formed.  Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 560 A.2d 655, 659-
60 (N.J. 1989).  A party seeking reformation for mutual 
mistake must show that both parties labored under the same 
misapprehension as to a particular and essential fact.  Id. at 
660.  The understanding of persons who were not contracting 
parties at the time of consummation of a contract is irrelevant.  
Gross, 134 A.2d at 737 (stating that courts should only look 
at the intent of the contracting parties at the time of 
consummation of a contract); Sav. Inv. & Trust Co. v. Conn. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 85 A.2d 311, 314 (N.J. Super. 1952) 
(“Equity, in an effort to effectuate the intent of contracting 
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parties, will exercise its power to reform instruments where 
there has been a mutual mistake of the parties.”). 
 “The power of a court of equity to reform deeds and 
other writings for the correction of mistakes stands among its 
most ancient and useful powers.”  Cummins v. Bulgin, 37 N.J. 
Eq. 476, 476 (1883).  That power is not limited to the original 
parties to the contract, but extends to all those standing in 
privity with them.  Union Fur Shop. v. Max Melzer, Inc., 29 
A.2d 873, 876 (N.J. 1943) (subsequent purchaser of business 
entitled to reformation of contract between original seller and 
buyer, based upon evidence of original seller‟s and buyer‟s 
common intention); see also Allen B. Du Mont Lab., Inc. v. 
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 152 A.2d 841, 846 (N.J. 1959) (rejecting 
argument that reformation is impossible in the absence of an 
original party to the transaction:  “If reformation is sought to 
establish a right against another, then of course that other 
must be before the court; a party to the mistake need not be 
joined unless he has a subsisting interest that will be 
affected.”). 
 The District Court held that “because Wyndham did 
not participate in the negotiation and drafting of the 2008 
policy, there can be no mutual mistake.”  Illinois Nat’l Ins. 
Co., 2010 WL 3326709 at *5.  Id.  We believe this is an 
errant interpretation of New Jersey law.  Reformation on the 
basis of mutual mistake can be granted even when it is to the 
disadvantage of a third party. 
 Turning to the facts, Illinois National and Jet Aviation 
were the only parties that negotiated and drafted the 2008 
policy.  (App. at A397-98.)  As Wyndham admits, it “had 
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[no] involvement with . . . [the] revision to the Endorsement.  
[The contracting parties] never communicated with 
Wyndham to discuss the revision or request input. . . . [And,] 
Wyndham never had an opportunity to form an understanding 
of what [the contracting parties] intended when [they] 
inserted „Named Insured.‟”  (Br. for Appellee Wyndham at 
7.)  Jet Aviation and Illinois National agree that their intent, at 
the time the contract was drafted, was to limit coverage for 
non-owned aircraft to aircraft used by or at the direction of Jet 
Aviation.  (App. at A1773.) 
 Under these circumstances, the District Court erred by 
not analyzing the contract under the principles of mutual 
mistake set forth under New Jersey law.  On remand, the 
District Court should evaluate Illinois National‟s and Jet 
Aviation‟s intent as well as Wyndham‟s arguments that 
reformation may be inequitable due to negligence and 
because the remedy is sought after an accident. 
IV. 
 Illinois National argues that the District Court also 
erred by determining that Illinois National‟s complaint 
seeking declaratory judgment should be dismissed under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 9(b).  The District Court stated that Illinois 
National had failed to “identify with the required particularity 
„the who, what, when, where, and how‟ of the mistake as 
required by Rule 9(b).”  Illinois National, 2010 WL 3326709 
at *12.  Rule 9(b) provides that when a party alleges fraud or 
mistake, “a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  Id.  Rule 9(b) 
exists to insure adequate notice so that defendants can 
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intelligently respond.  Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, 
McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 414 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide notice, not to 
test the factual allegations of the claim.”). 
 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege 
facts sufficient to nudge his claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 
F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).).  Illinois National‟s 
complaint stated that it sought a declaratory judgment that the 
2008 policy did not cover the August 2008 Cessna incident.  
(App. at A40.)  The complaint stated the understanding of the 
parties, Illinois National and Jet Aviation, at the time of 
drafting:  “[d]uring the negotiations for each of the Policies, 
the parties understood and agreed that liability coverage 
available to Insured Owners for the use of non-owned aircraft 
was limited to non-owned aircraft operated by or used at the 
direction of Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc.”  (Id. at A41.)  
Further, it identified the specific drafting error that had been 
made.  (Id. at A45.)  Specifically, the 2008 policy substituted 
“Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc.” with “Named Insured” 
without realizing that doing so could lead to the contract 
being read to provide coverage to Insured Owners for non-
owned aircraft that were not operated by or used at the 
direction of Jet Aviation Business Jets, Inc.  (Id.) 
 The complaint was sufficient.  It specifically alleged 
the mistake and the remedy being sought.  (Id. at A43-6.)  
Wyndham‟s counterclaim shows that it understood what was 
being pleaded.  (Id. at A52-64.)  Illinois National‟s complaint 
met the purpose of Rule 9(b) in that Wyndham was able to 
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answer, engage in discovery, and move for summary 
judgment on its counterclaim. 
 The District Court therefore erred in granting 
Wyndham‟s motion to dismiss Illinois National‟s complaint 
pursuant to Rule 9(b). 
V. 
 We conclude that the District Court‟s grant of 
Wyndham‟s motion for summary judgment and motion to 
dismiss Illinois National‟s complaint were in error.  
Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
3
 
                                                 
3
 Illinois National also contends that the District Court 
erred in its interpretation of the Managed Aircraft 
Endorsement and in its refusal to allow Illinois National 
additional discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (now 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)) prior to its grant of Wyndham‟s motion 
for summary judgment.  Because we dispose of this case on 
the grounds that Illinois National‟s complaint was sufficient 
and that the District Court applied the incorrect test for 
mutual mistake, we do not reach the Illinois National‟s other 
arguments for reversal. 
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Nygaard, Circuit Judge, dissenting.   
 The majority’s exclusive focus upon mutual mistake, 
and the intent of Illinois National and Jet Aviation is, I 
respectfully submit, misplaced.  There is no mutual mistake 
here, only negligence and ignorance—neither of which is a 
legitimate basis for an equitable reformation of the contract.  
The insurer made changes to its policy, and negligently sold 
the altered policy to the insured, who was ignorant of the 
changes.  Although Jet Aviation facilitated the procurement 
of Wyndham’s aircraft insurance coverage with Illinois 
National, this fact does not eliminate the general contractual 
obligations of the insurer to the insured.  As written, the 
Endorsement—expressing the aircraft insurance coverage 
purchased by Wyndham—extended the indemnification of Jet 
Aviation’s policy with Illinois National to insure the non-
owned aircraft of the “Named Insured.”  The Endorsement 
explicitly references Wyndham as a “Named Insured.”  The 
insurer indemnified the insured on these terms and these 
words are binding. 
 
 As we have previously stated, New Jersey law insists 
that insurance policies are to be interpreted according to their 
“plain, ordinary meaning.”  Colliers Lanard & Axilbund v. 
Lloyds of London, 458 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 869 A.2d 929, 
933 (2005).  The plain meaning of a contract can be 
overridden only in rare, exceptional circumstances.  Id.  
Moreover, while I do not read any patent or latent ambiguity 
here, in such instances policies generally “should be 
construed to sustain coverage.”  President v. Jenkins, 853 
A.2d 247, 254 (2004).  There is simply no support in state law 
for the conclusion that the insurer’s failure to read the plain 
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language of its own policy before issuing it to the insured 
justifies supplanting these well-accepted tenets of contract 
and insurance law with considerations of equity to reform the 
contract.  This is particularly so where, as here, the insurer 
seeks reformation post-loss.  Judge Brown analyzed these 
issues thoroughly and reasonably.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
